Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty:An Opportunity to Enhance Legal Certainty in Investor-State Dispute Settlement by Verburg, Cees
  
 University of Groningen
Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty:
Verburg, Cees
Published in:
The Journal of World Investment and Trade
DOI:
10.1163/22119000-12340144
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Verburg, C. (2019). Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty: An Opportunity to Enhance Legal Certainty in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement. The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 20(2-3), 425-454.
https://doi.org/10.1163/22119000-12340144
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 13-11-2019
© Cees Verburg, 2019 | doi:10.1163/22119000-12340144
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC license at the time of 
publication.
Journal of World Investment &  
Trade 20 (2019) 425–454
Article
∵
Modernising the Energy Charter Treaty:  
An Opportunity to Enhance Legal Certainty in 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
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c.g.verburg@rug.nl
Abstract
The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral trade and investment agreement that is 
currently the most often-invoked investment agreement worldwide. A review of the 
case law under the treaty shows that its provisions have been interpreted and applied 
inconsistently by arbitral tribunals and domestic courts. Considering the financial and 
reputational consequences of investment arbitration for both the investor and the 
State, a lack of ‘legal certainty’ adversely affects all parties involved. This article iden-
tifies various inconsistencies, some of the causes, and proposes solutions that could 
enhance legal certainty in investor-State dispute settlement under the treaty. This is a 
timely contribution as the Energy Charter Conference has recently taken the first steps 
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to modernise the treaty by approving a list of topics for reform, and is now considering 
tools to implement future reform measures.
Keywords
Energy Charter Treaty – dispute settlement – legal certainty – rule of law – treaty 
interpretation
1 Introduction
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral investment agreement nego-
tiated in the early 1990s. With more than 50 Contracting Parties in primarily 
Europe and Asia, it is arguably the most important international investment 
agreement (IIA) in existence. The ECT does not only protect investments 
in the energy sector, where there is an abundance of political risk for long-
term investments that are capital intensive and can involve sunk costs, but 
the ECT is also at present by far the most often invoked IIA in investor-State 
disputes with 120 known cases.1 As the energy sector is strictly regulated in 
most jurisdictions and States should be able to impose, for example, bona fide 
environmental regulations without violating international obligations, it is of 
profound importance for both States and investors that they are able to predict 
what is protected under the treaty.2 For a State, the determination of whether 
or not such regulations might violate the ECT is for example important in 
order to avoid regulatory chill. This, however, requires a certain level of pre-
dictability in terms of how adjudicators interpret and apply treaty provisions.
The principle of legal certainty, which is essential to the rule of law, 
entails the ‘idea that the law must be sufficiently clear to provide those subject 
to legal norms with the means to regulate their own conduct and to protect 
against the arbitrary exercise of public power.’3 The ECT, whose purpose is to 
establish a legal framework to promote long-term cooperation in the energy 
1  For an overview of known ECT investor-State disputes, see Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘All 
Investment Dispute Settlement Cases’ <https://energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settle 
ment/all-investment-dispute-settlement-cases/> accessed 17 December 2018.
2   Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
“Regulatory Taking” in International Law’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 811, 815–817.
3   Mark Fenwick and Stefan Wrbka, ‘The Shifting Meaning of Legal Certainty’ in Mark Fenwick 
and others (eds), Legal Certainty in a Contemporary Context: Private and Criminal Law 
Perspectives (Springer 2016) 1. See also Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of 
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field, explicitly obliges Contracting Parties to create ‘stable, equitable, favour-
able and transparent’ conditions for investors while also calling on States to 
formulate ‘stable and transparent legal frameworks.’4
This article argues that it is desirable for a certain level of predictability to 
exist in the interpretation and application of the treaty by adjudicators, con-
gruent with the principles of the rule of law.5 However, this does not mean that 
absolute consistency should be pursued – law should be capable of evolving 
over time and absolutism might even go so far as to deliver unjust results.6 
Especially for a treaty whose substantive investment standards incorporate 
terms as ‘fair’, ‘equitable’, and ‘unreasonable’, absolute consistency ought not 
be the aim. The content of these notions may evolve and the factual circum-
stances of each specific case are often of great importance.7 Indeed, it may even 
be desirable for case law to evolve in order to incorporate changing societal 
circumstances and demands. Therefore, the author does not argue in favour 
of binding precedents and the application of the principle of stare decisis in 
investment arbitration. Rather, he advances the thesis that when decisions 
taken diverge from previous decisions; these ought to contain reasons setting 
forth the relevant considerations while at the same time ensuring a certain 
level of predictability in ECT investor-State dispute settlement.
Like decisions rendered under other IIAs, various ECT provisions have 
been interpreted and applied inconsistently by arbitral tribunals and domestic 
the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ in Richard Bellamy (ed), The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers (Routledge 2005) 95.
4   Energy Charter Treaty (Annex I of the Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference) 
(signed 17 December 1994, entered into force 16 April 1998) (1995) 34 ILM 373 (ECT) arts 2, 10(1). 
See also Concluding Document of The Hague Conference on the European Energy Charter 
(signed 17 December 1991) title I <https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/
Legal/1991_European_Energy_Charter.pdf> accessed 28 November 2018.
5   Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (CUP 2004) 66, 97, 119; Stephan 
W Schill, ‘The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within’ in Jean E Kalicki and Anna 
Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 
21st Century (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 621, 632; Colin M Brown, ‘A Multilateral Mechanism for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes. Some Preliminary Sketches’ (2017) 32(3) ICSID Rev 673, 
676–680; Stephan W Schill, ‘Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A (Comparative 
and International) Constitutional Law Framework’ (2017) 20(3) JIEL 649, 655–656.
6   Michael Ewing-Chow, ‘Coherence, Convergence and Consistency in International Investment 
Law’ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law 
and Policy: World Trade Forum (CUP 2013) 228, 231–233; Thomas Schultz, ‘Against Consistency 
in Investment Arbitration’ in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E Viñuales 
(eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice 
(OUP 2014) 297.
7   Concerning the evolution of the international minimum standard, see Rudolf Dolzer and 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 139–141.
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courts. Moreover, ECT tribunals sometimes explicitly criticise one another 
when examining comparable arguments.8 This issue arises in part due to 
the vague nature of various ECT provisions, which increases the likelihood 
of inconsistent interpretations. Another issue relates to the multiplicity of 
cases involving comparable matters, causing confusion when tribunals render 
contradictory awards in relation to the same challenged measure(s).9 Hence, 
after having reviewed the implementation of the investment chapter of the 
ECT, the Energy Charter Conference announced in 2017 that it would consider 
the need to modernise a treaty and, more recently, approved a list of topics 
for the discussion on the modernisation of the treaty.10 The next step in the 
modernisation process is to identify potential policy options for the relevant 
topics and analyse the instruments that can be used to implement any future 
decision.11 This article contributes to this discussion.
To that end, Section 2 outlines some of the inconsistencies in ECT case law. 
Section 3 subsequently examines the potential causes of these inconsistencies. 
In Section 4, available tools to address these inconsistencies are identified. As 
such, this part contains an analysis of those options currently being consid-
ered by the Energy Charter Conference, including amendments or additional 
protocols to legally binding instruments (e.g. to the treaty) as well as soft law 
alternatives such as interpretations by the Contracting Parties in the form of 
8    The Blusun v Italy tribunal, for example, criticised the standard of review proposed by 
the Charanne and Construction Investments v Spain, SCC Case No V 062/2012, Award 
(21 January 2016) tribunal concerning a legitimate expectations claim regarding support 
for a renewable energy project, see Blusun SA, Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v 
Italian Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/14/3, Final Award (27 December 2016) para 318. 
The Novenergia v Spain tribunal openly disagreed with the standard of review of legiti-
mate expectations as proposed by the Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar 
Luxembourg Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/36, Final Award (4 May 2017) 
tribunal, see Novenergia II – Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), 
SICAR v The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Arb No 063/2015, Final Award (15 February 2018) 
para 694.
9    Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic are all facing various claims as a result of regulatory 
changes to their renewable energy support schemes. Turkey was involved in several ECT 
cases brought by businessman Cem Cengiz Uzan while in all ECT cases involving the 
Russian Federation questions concerning the provisional application of the treaty arise.
10   Energy Charter Secretariat, Decision of the Energy Charter Conference on the 
Modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty (28 November 2017) CCDEC 2017 23 STR, 
para 2. Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics for the Modernisation of the 
Energy Charter Treaty’ (29 November 2018) <https://energycharter.org/media/news/
article/approved-topics-for-the-modernisation-of-the-energy-charter-treaty/?tx_news_
pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=3da319e52a7
8fa54058bc2c08eecc214> accessed 17 December 2018.
11   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
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an Energy Charter Declaration.12 Before concluding, the paper will also con-
sider inter se modification of the ECT by a group of like-minded States, as 
well as strengthening the role of non-disputing ECT Contracting Parties in 
ongoing disputes.
2 Inconsistencies in ECT Jurisprudence: Some Illustrative Examples
First, several examples of inconsistent rulings in ECT investor-State cases are 
provided to illustrate the problem at hand.
2.1 The Definition of ‘Investment’: Does a Contract Debt Qualify as Such?
Adjudicators have taken different approaches to the question whether con-
tract debts can qualify as a protected investment under the ECT in the absence 
of an ‘underlying’ investment, such as any fixed assets. As a tribunal’s decision 
to hear a dispute is contingent on the threshold question of the existence of an 
‘investment’, a consistent approach is desirable.13
In several ECT cases the investment at issue consisted of a claim to money 
where that claim did not arise out of an economic activity carried out by an 
underlying asset in the host State. In that regard, in Energoalliance v Moldova, 
the tribunal held that contract debts could qualify as an investment, thereby 
arguably following in the footsteps of Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic in which 
the term ‘investment’ was interpreted broadly.14 In his dissenting opinion, 
Dominic Pellew, the President of the Energoalliance tribunal, clarified that he 
disagrees with the finding that acquired contract debt could qualify as invest-
ment protected under the ECT because, amongst others, the acquisition of 
debt does not contribute to the economy of the host State.15 Initially, in 2016, 
Pellew’s position was confirmed by the Paris Court of Appeals, which set aside 
the Energoalliance award on the basis of similar arguments.16 In March 2018, 
however, the Court of Cassation held the Appellate Court to have erred in 
12   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Modernisation Decision’ (n 10) para 1.
13   ECT, art 1(6).
14   Energoalliance Ltd v the Republic of Moldova, UNCITRAL, Unofficial Translation of the 
Arbitral Award (25 October 2013) paras 225–227. See also Petrobart Limited v the Kyrgyz 
Republic, SCC Arb No 126/2003, Final Award (29 March 2005) 70–72; Republic of Kyrgyzstan 
v Petrobart Limited, CA Svea, 19 January 2007, Case No T5208–05, 9.
15   Energoalliance Ltd v the Republic of Moldova, UNCITRAL, Dissenting Opinion of 
Arbitrator Dominic Pellew (25 October 2013) paras 3, 26. Pellew, however, was outvoted 
by the party appointed arbitrators.
16   Republique de Moldavie v Société Komstroy, CA Paris, 1e Ch, 12 April 2016, nº 13/22531, 6.
Downloaded from Brill.com05/22/2019 10:17:32AM
via Universiteit Groningen
430 Verburg
Journal of World Investment & Trade 20 (2019) 425–454
setting aside the award.17 Although the Court of Cassation did not explicitly 
state that Energoalliance’s investment should qualify as such under the ECT, it 
considered the Court of Appeals to be wrong in holding a contribution to the 
host State economy to be a qualificatory requirement by virtue of the ECT.18
In the factually comparable Energorynok v Moldova case, the tribunal 
rejected contract debt to amount to an investment under the ECT.19 One 
should note, however, that the award in Energorynok was rendered 
after Energoalliance but before the ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals. 
Notwithstanding, the mere fact that various courts and tribunals have come 
to different conclusions in comparable cases leads to uncertainty over the 
boundaries of the term ‘investment’; a term that determines both the scope 
of the treaty and the jurisdiction of a tribunal. At the 2018 Energy Charter 
Conference, the definition of ‘investment’ was included in the list of approved 
topics for the modernisation discussions.20
2.2 Application of the Standards of Investment Protection
A second phenomenon is the inconsistent interpretation of the standards of 
investment protection in ECT investor-State dispute settlement. One example 
particular to the provisions of the ECT concerns the significance of the first 
sentence of Article 10(1) ECT, which provides that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party 
shall … encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in 
its Area.’ At dispute is whether this sentence contains an autonomous standard 
that provides for a distinct cause of action or whether it is simply an introduc-
tion to the rest of Article 10(1) ECT, which outlines the various standards of 
investment protection, including the FET standard.
In its 2013 decision, the Energoalliance v Moldova tribunal appeared to 
view the first sentence of Article 10(1) ECT as a distinct obligation, holding 
that the respondent had violated its obligation ‘to create “stable, equitable, 
favourable and transparent conditions” for Claimant’s investment’ because 
17   Energoalians SARL (Komstroy) v Republique de Moldavie v, Civ 1ère, 28 March 2018, 
nº 16–16568, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:C100352.
18   The contribution to the development of the host State may be relevant when defining 
the term ‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention, see Christoph H Schreuer and others, 
The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn CUP 2009) 129–134; Damien Charlotin, 
‘Energy Charter Treaty Award Is Revived by Court, Re-Stoking Debate as to Whether a 
“Contribution” Is an Essential Feature of an Investment- or Whether a Mere “Claim to 
Money” Also Qualifies’ (IAReporter, 10 April 2018).
19   State Enterprise ‘Energorynok’ v the Republic of Moldova, SCC Arb No V2012/175, Final 
Award (29 January 2015) para 101.
20   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
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the investor had been denied justice.21 The AES v Kazakhstan tribunal, on the 
other hand, held an entirely different view in a decision rendered a week after 
Energoalliance:
[T]he first sentence of Article 10(1) of the ECT … is an introductory sen-
tence aimed at putting the further obligations laid out in Article 10(1) of 
the ECT into perspective. As such, it has mainly programmatic character 
and does not provide for an independent standard of protection or right 
of action of a kind that is sufficiently specific to be relied upon by an 
investor.22
In 2016, this uncertainty was further exacerbated. The Blusun v Italy tribunal 
held that none of the sentences of Article 10(1) are ‘merely hortatory or pream-
bular’ and that the significance of the first sentence extends beyond the ‘initial 
making of the investment’ while in Isolux v Spain, on the basis of the conclu-
sion reached in the Plama v Bulgaria case, the tribunal rejected the argument 
that the first sentence contained an autonomous obligation altogether.23
During the modernisation process, various standards of investment protec-
tion will be discussed as reflected by the 2018 decision of the Energy Charter 
Conference, including the standards relating to FET, Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) treatment, most constant protection and security, compensation for 
losses, indirect expropriation, and the observance of obligations.24
2.3 The Relationship Between the ECT and European Union Law
A third issue that has given rise to fundamentally different conclusions is 
the relationship between the ECT and European Union (EU) law. Resort to 
ECT-based dispute settlement has increased significantly in intra-EU rela-
tions since the privatisation and liberalisation of, and consequent increase in 
cross-border investment activity in, European energy markets. Fundamental 
questions relating to the intra-EU applicability of the ECT and its compatibil-
ity with EU law remain contentious. The relevance of this topic has increased 
exponentially since the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
21   Energoalliance Ltd (n 14) para 356.
22   AES Corporation and Tau Power BV v the Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/ 
10/16, Award (1 November 2013) para 380.
23   Blusun (n 8) paras 319, 342. See also Plama Consortium Limited v The Republic of Bulgaria, 
ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 2008) para 173; Isolux Infrastructure 
Netherlands BV v The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Arb No V2013/153, Final Award (17 July 2016) 
paras 764–766.
24   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
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(CJEU) in Achmea v Slovakia, in which the CJEU held arbitration clauses in 
intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to be incompatible with EU law.25
In the Electrabel v Hungary case, the tribunal held that EU law prevails over 
the ECT ‘in case of any material inconsistency’ while the opposite conclu-
sion was reached in RREEF v Spain.26 Furthermore, in AES v Hungary, a case 
factually comparable to Electrabel, the tribunal took EU law into account 
as a ‘fact’ in the same manner as it did national law upon the urging of both 
parties.27 The tribunal added thereto that it was mindful ‘that a State may not 
invoke its domestic law as an excuse for alleged breaches of its international 
obligations.’28
Does the relationship between EU law and the ECT perhaps differ depend-
ing on the subject matter of the issue at hand? The Vattenfall tribunal held that 
the ECT cannot be interpreted in a manner ‘so as to give priority to external 
treaties’, such as the EU treaties, in relation to jurisdiction while it remained 
silent on any such relationship in case of an incompatibility between the ECT 
and EU law that relates to the merits.29 Furthermore, by reference to the lex 
specialis rule on conflict of laws, the tribunal resolved the friction between 
the conflict clauses of the ECT and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
in favour of the ECT.30 It seems safe to say that, with regard to these two 
aspects, the Vattenfall tribunal thus considered the ECT to prevail over EU law.
The relationship between the ECT and EU law is not explicitly dealt with 
in the text of the ECT.31 During the ECT negotiations, however, the European 
Commission proposed to preclude the application of the ECT in intra-EU rela-
tions whenever relevant EU rules concerning the particular subject could be 
25   CJEU, Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.
26   Electrabel SA v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability (30 November 2012) para 4.191; RREEF Infrastructure (GP) 
Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction (6 June 2016) para 87.
27   AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v The Republic of Hungary, 
ICSID Case No ARB/07/22, Award (23 September 2010) para 7.6.6.
28   ibid.
29   Vattenfall AB and Others v Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No ARB/12/12, 
Decision on the Achmea Issue (31 August 2018) paras 109, 131. Where it concerns an 
alleged lack of jurisdiction because of an inconsistency between the ECT and EU law, 
the Electrabel tribunal held that certain arguments based on EU law cannot be taken 
into account ‘because they are based on a hierarchy of legal rules seen only from the 
perspective of an EU legal order applying within the EU, whereas this tribunal is required 
to operate in the international legal framework of the ECT and the ICSID Convention, 
outside the European Union.’ See Electrabel (n 26) para 4.112.
30   Vattenfall (n 29) paras 222–229.
31   One may very well argue that Article 16 of the ECT applies to this relationship.
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relied upon.32 It is clear, given the current text of the treaty, that this proposal 
was rejected.33
As alluded to before, the Achmea judgment of the CJEU underlines the rele-
vance of this topic. Although this ruling did not concern an ECT case, and one 
can thus argue the Achmea case to be irrelevant for intra-EU ECT cases, the 
CJEU is expected to rule on intra-EU ECT arbitration in Novenergia v Spain.34 
At present, the European Commission regularly intervenes in intra-EU dis-
putes and argues that intra-EU ECT arbitration is incompatible with EU law.35 
ECT tribunals have rejected these objections thus far.36 However, in light of 
Achmea, ECT tribunals might find it more difficult to maintain such a position 
and could be forced to address the systemic consequences of the incompat-
ibility between the ECT and EU law. This might, in turn, give rise to seemingly 
inconsistent decisions wherein legal considerations beyond the ECT could 
come into play, such as whether the tribunal operates under the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID Convention) that established the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or not and, if not, whether the tri-
bunal is seated within or outside the EU. ECT tribunals seated in the EU legal 
order, and thus operating under the supervision of the CJEU, might be more 
32   The disconnection clause, which was proposed for inclusion in what is now Article 24 
ECT, stated ‘[i]n their mutual relations, Contracting Parties which are members of the 
EC shall apply Community rules and shall not therefore apply the rules arising from 
this Agreement except insofar as there is no Community rule governing the particular 
subject concerned.’ See Letter from Secretary-General Clive Jones to Ambassador Rutten 
(19 February 1993); Draft Basic Agreement for the European Energy Charter (12 August 
1992) 84, comment 27.18.
33   Vattenfall (n 29) paras 201–206.
34   Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/14/01, 
Award (16 May 2018) paras 678–683; Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sàrl and 
Antin Energia Termosolar BV v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/31, Award (15 
June 2018) para 224;. Vattenfall (n 29) para 163. See also Damien Charlotin, ‘Post-Achmea 
Developments: Spain Wants Court to Ask ECJ to Rule on Compatibility of Energy Charter 
Treaty with EU law; ‘Achmea Ruling also Touted by Poland as Reason for Discontinued 
BIT Case’ (IAReporter, 22 May 2018).
35   Electrabel (n 26) paras 4.1–4.199; Blusun (n 8) paras 277–303; Masdar (n 34) paras 296–342.
36   Charanne and Construction Investments v The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Arb No 062/2012, 
Unofficial Translation of the Final Award (21 January 2016) paras 424–450; RREEF (n 26) 
paras 78–80; Blusun (n 8) para 303; Isolux (n 23) paras 622–60; Eiser Infrastructure Limited 
and Energía Solar Luxembourg Sàrl v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/36, 
Final Award (4 May 2017) paras 197–204; Novenergia (n 8) paras 449–466; Antin (n 34) 
paras 224–230; Masdar (n 34) paras 296–342.
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receptive to arguments based on the primacy of EU law than ICSID tribunals 
or those ECT tribunals seated outside the EU legal order.37
The aforementioned uncertainty regarding the relationship between the 
ECT and EU law is problematic for European investors and EU Member States 
alike.38 With approximately 60 percent of all known ECT disputes intra-EU 
in nature, many of which are still pending, Achmea has only exacerbated the 
uncertainty reigning to date.39 Although domestic courts can indeed settle 
ECT investor-State disputes, an avenue compatible with EU law, arbitration 
seems to be the preferred avenue.40 Whether intra-EU ECT arbitration is still 
(effectively) available remains to be seen.
2.4 Provisional Application of the ECT
A final example that clearly illustrates the practical consequences of incon-
sistencies is the set of contradictory rulings on Article 45 ECT concerning the 
provisional application of the treaty. While neither the Russian Federation nor 
Belarus has ratified the ECT, both apply the treaty provisionally on the basis of 
Article 45 ECT.41 However, Article 45 contains a rather ambiguous limitation 
clause which has given rise to divergent interpretations.42
This divergence can be illustrated by reference to the Yukos v Russian 
Federation case, wherein the ECT tribunal and the District Court of the Hague 
rendered inconsistent decisions. In essence, the ECT tribunal accepted that 
Article 45 ECT allows for the provisional application of the ECT ‘as a whole’ 
pending entry into force, unless ‘the principle of provisional application itself 
were inconsistent “with [the State’s] constitution, laws, or regulations.” ’43 This 
conclusion finds support in an earlier ECT deliberation, namely Kardassopoulos v 
Georgia, and has since also been adopted in two other ongoing arbitrations 
37   Cees Verburg and Nikos Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases 
and the Potential Consequences of the Achmea Judgment for Intra-EU ECT Arbitrations’ 
(2018) 3 European Investment Law and Arbitration Review 197, 214–5.
38   All EU Member States are a Contracting Party to the ECT although Italy withdrew in 2016. 
Italy is, however, bound to the sunset clause of the ECT.
39   Eric Leikin and Martina Magnarelli, ‘The Future of Intra-EU ECT Claims in the Face of EC 
Opposition: Boom or Bust?’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 15 September 2017) <http://arbitra 
tionblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/09/15/icca-2/> accessed 2 October 2018.
40   ECT, art 26(2)(a).
41   The Russian Federation withdrew from the treaty in 2009.
42   ECT, art 45 reads ‘Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its 
entry into force for such signatory in accordance with Art. 44, to the extent that such 
provisional application is consistent with its constitution, laws or regulations.’
43   Yukos Universal Ltd v Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA227, UNCITRAL, Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 November 2009) para 301.
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against the Russian Federation on the topic of the Yukos bankruptcy.44 The 
District Court of the Hague, however, saw things differently. It held that the 
‘option of provisional application is focused on and depends on the compatibil-
ity of separate treaty provisions with national laws’, concluding that Russia was 
not bound by Article 26 ECT and that the ECT tribunal lacked jurisdiction.45 
Under the approach of the District Court, one has to examine the compatibil-
ity of the treaty provision at issue with the constitution, laws, and regulations 
of a given State. This stands in stark contrast with the approach of ECT tribu-
nals. The latter deem the ECT provisionally applicable as a whole unless the 
principle of provisional application as such is inconsistent with the constitu-
tion, laws, or regulations of a Contracting Party.
These examples, although by no means an exhaustive overview of all 
conflicting outcomes in ECT cases, clearly illustrate the presence of inconsis-
tencies that are particular to the ECT. Nevertheless, despite the presence of 
inconsistencies, one must also point out that there are areas of convergence 
in ECT jurisprudence; such as the interpretation and application of the provi-
sions on denial of benefits and indirect expropriation.46
44   Ioannis Kardassopoulos v Georgia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(6 July 2007) paras 223, 246. See also Luke E Peterson, ‘In Second-Wave Yukos Arbitration, 
McLachlan and Rowley See Russia as Provisionally Bound by Energy Charter Treaty’ 
(IAReporter, 16 February 2017); Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Interim Award in Luxtona v. Russia 
Arbitration Comes to Light, Offering New Reasoning on Provisional Application of Energy 
Charter Treaty and Russia’s Attempted Denial of Benefits to this Yukos Shareholder’ 
(IAReporter, 4 January 2018).
45   Russian Federation v Yukos Universal Ltd, Rb The Hague (20 April 2016), Case No C/09/ 
477162 / HA ZA 15–2, para 5.18.
46   In relation to Article 17 of the ECT, tribunals have held that the right to deny benefits 
has to be actively exercised and can only have prospective – and not retrospective or 
retroactive – effects. See eg Plama Consortium Limited v The Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 February 2005) paras 155–162; Yukos 
(n 43) paras 456–459; Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v The Republic 
of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/07/14, Excerpts of the Award (22 June 2010) paras 
224–226; Khan Resources Inc, Khan Resources BV, and Cauc Holding Company Ltd v The 
Government of Mongolia, PCA Case No 2011–09, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(25 July 2012) paras 421–431; Masdar (n 34) paras 232–243. Concerning indirect expro-
priation claims, ECT tribunals have adopted the so-called ‘sole effects doctrine’, albeit 
with slightly different nuances. See eg Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v The 
Republic of Latvia, SCC Arb No 118/2001, Award (16 December 2003) para 4.3.1; Plama 
(n 23) paras 191–193; Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v The Republic of Tajikistan, SCC 
Arb No V064/2008, Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (2 September 2009) paras 
279–281; Liman Caspian Oil (n 46) para 293; AES (n 27) para 14.3.1; Electrabel (n 26) para 
6.53–6.64; Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe SA v The Republic of Albania, 
ICSID Case No ARB/11/24, Award (30 March 2015) paras 561–572; Charanne (n 36) paras 
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3 Potential Causes of Inconsistencies
Having established that irregularities exist, one can investigate the causes at 
heart of these inconsistencies.
3.1 Ad Hoc Nature of Arbitration and Lack of Appeal Mechanism
A first potential cause of the various inconsistencies is the ad hoc nature of 
arbitration, the primary mechanism to settle investor-State disputes, and the 
lack of an appeal mechanism. Arguably, arbitration is a suitable mechanism 
to settle disputes between the parties involved, but less capable of contribut-
ing to the development of the law by enunciating a consistent body of case 
law. In national and international legal systems where appeals mechanisms 
exist, the highest authority can ensure a consistent application of the law and 
simultaneously steer the development thereof. International investment law 
lacks such an appeals mechanism as recourse at the seat of arbitration or the 
annulment procedure under the ICSID Convention is merely possible on very 
limited grounds.47 Inconsistent arbitral decision-making is one of several rea-
sons underlying the EU’s move away from investor-State dispute settlement 
through arbitration towards a court-based system with an appeals mechanism, 
as evidenced by recent EU IIAs and ongoing efforts at UNCITRAL to establish 
a multilateral investment court.48
Since the applicable law in all ECT disputes is the same, namely the ‘treaty 
and applicable rules and principles of international law’, one might expect deci-
sions to be somewhat consistent or at least evidence convergence – especially 
since investment tribunals, including ECT tribunals, have acknowledged the 
importance of consistency in and the relevance of earlier arbitral decisions.49 
Nevertheless, this has only happened in a handful of areas with inconsisten-
cies remaining in others.
Generally, divergence in arbitral decision-making is more seemingly preva-
lent in international investment law than in other areas of public international 
460–461; Isolux (n 23) paras 835–839; Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 SÁRL, Foresight 
Luxembourg Solar 2 SÁRL, Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I SPA 
and GWM Renewable Energy II SPA v Kingdom of Spain, SCC Arb No V 2015/150, Final 
Award (14 November 2018) para 429. Slightly less unequivocal support for the ‘sole effects 
doctrine’ can be found in Blusun (n 8) paras 398–400.
47   Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (OUP 2015) 434.
48   Brown (n 5) 677.
49   ECT, art 26(6). See eg Saipem SpA v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures 
(21 March 2007) para 67; Mamidoil (n 46) para 565.
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law that use arbitration to settle disputes. In the law of the sea, for example, 
along with two international adjudicatory bodies, arbitration has played a 
major role in maritime delimitation cases.50 Although this area of law indeed 
also has no appellate review, the interaction between various courts and tri-
bunals has been described as ‘mutually reinforcing.’51 This might, in part, be 
due to significant overlap between the judges and arbitrators in the law of the 
sea cases – since tribunals are often comprised of former, current, or future 
judges from relevant international courts.52 In ECT arbitration, the group of 
arbitrators is much more diverse: out of the 144 individuals appointed in ECT 
cases, 80 arbitrators received just one appointment.53 Having such plurality in 
decision makers, noting in particular the unavoidable differences in terms of 
their background, might contribute to inconsistencies as each may hold dif-
ferent views or adopt different approaches to examine the relevant matters.54 
This suggests that the modernisation process of the ECT ought to consider the 
possibility of a centralised appellate facility, a dedicated ECT court, or a roster 
of arbitrators for ECT disputes. However, these options are currently not being 
considered in the modernisation process.55
3.2 Textual Deficiencies
A second potential cause of incoherence is the text of the ECT itself which 
has been said ‘not [to be] a paragon of drafting clarity’ since it, like many other 
50   Bernard H Oxman, ‘Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS, and Arbitral Tribunals’ in 
Donald R Rothwell and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (OUP 
2015) 394.
51   Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the 
Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ 
(2001) 32 Ocean Dev & Intl L 1, 14–15; Chao Wang, ‘International Arbitration of Maritime 
Delimitation: An Alternative for East Asia’ (2014) 7 J E Asia & Intl L 427, 433.
52   J Ashley Roach, ‘Arbitration under the Law of the Sea Convention’ in John N Moore (ed), 
International Arbitration: Contemporary Issues and Innovations (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 
135, 140–143.
53   UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Hub’ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/> accessed 
28 November 2018. This figure includes individuals appointed in all known pending, con-
cluded, and discontinued cases of which the relevant information is publicly available. 
Arbitrators that were initially appointed but subsequently replaced during the process 
have not been included.
54   Lars Markert, ‘International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation – Problems, 
Particularities and Possible Trends’ in Rainer Hofmann and Christian J Tams (eds), 
International Investment Law and General International Law: From Clinical Isolation to 
Systemic Integration? (Nomos 2011) 53, 61–64; August Reinisch, ‘The Interpretation of 
International Investment Agreements’ in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), International 
Investment Law: A Handbook (CH Beck 2015) 372, 407–408.
55   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
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IIAs, lacks guidance on many important issues.56 The FET standard, the MFN 
obligation, the umbrella clause, and the prohibition on unreasonable mea-
sures that impair an investment are all open to divergent interpretations.57 
More recent IIAs, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA), usually contain more guidance in relation to some 
of these problematic standards.58
Another textual deficiency is the definition of ‘investment’ discussed above. 
According to Article 1(6) ECT, a claim to money or performance pursuant to 
a contract can constitute an ‘investment’ when it has ‘economic value’ and 
is ‘associated with an Investment.’ As noted by two ECT tribunals, the term 
‘investment’ is thus in certain circumstances defined by reference to ‘invest-
ment’, making the definition circular and ‘rais[ing] a logical problem [that] 
creates some doubt about the correct interpretation.’59 Therefore, one can 
argue that the root of the inconsistency problem lies in the text of the ECT 
itself, simply because it lacks guidance on so many important issues.
Of course, one could likewise maintain that many IIAs were deliberately 
drafted vaguely in order to ‘cover the broadest range of investment situations.’60 
While this may be true, at least from the perspective of the capital exporting 
countries, one can question whether the content of IIAs was properly negoti-
ated by all parties.61 As stated by Professor Schreuer, acting as an expert in a 
case against Argentina, in response to the question whether ‘he really believed 
that two sovereign States will negotiate, sign and ratify a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty without caring to consider what was put in it’:
56   Mahnoush H Arsanjani and W Michael Reisman, ‘Provisional Application of Treaties in 
International Law: The Energy Charter Treaty Awards’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law 
of Treaties: Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP 2011) 86, 91–93.
57   Mamidoil (n 46) para 599; Margie-Lys Jaime, ‘Relying upon Parties’ Interpretation 
in Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International 
Investment Agreements’ (2014) 46 Geo J Intl L 261, 272–281; Tarcisio Gazzini, Interpretation 
of International Investment Treaties (Hart 2016) 91–100.
58   cf the FET standard contained in art 10(1) ECT with Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (adopted 8 March 2018, not entered into 
force) (CPTPP) art 9.6; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European 
Union-Canada) (adopted 30 October 2016, not entered into force) (CETA) art 8.10.
59   Petrobart (n 14) 72; Energorynok (n 19) paras 83–84.
60   Luke E Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making (IISD 
2004) 27.
61   For a critical account of the investment treaty making process, see Lauge N Skovgaard 
Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment Treaties 
in Developing Countries (CUP 2015).
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… in the majority of times, BITs are among clauses of treaties that are not 
properly negotiated. BITs are very often pulled out of a drawer, often on 
the basis of some sort of a model, and are put forward on the occasion 
of state visits when the heads of states need something to sign, and the 
typical two candidates in a situation like that are Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, and treaties for cultural co-operation.62
Note, in this regard, that the first draft of the investment chapter of the ECT 
was also based on a model treaty: the 1991 Model BIT of the United Kingdom, 
which itself was drafted just months before what would eventually become 
the ECT.63 Also, the negotiating history of Article 10 ECT, which contains the 
vast majority of the standards of treatment, reveals that these standards were 
barely discussed. Rather, nearly all debate concerning Article 10 focused on the 
inclusion of pre-establishment rights.64
That being the case, one can question whether the negotiators of the ECT 
were aware of the potential implications of the unqualified standards of treat-
ment in IIAs, given that the first arbitration award based on an IIA was only 
rendered in 1990, and, more significantly, the first cases involving unqualified 
FET standards were not decided until 2000.65
62   Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/04/14, Award 
(8 December 2008) para 85.
63   cf Draft Treaty of the Basic Protocol to the European Energy Charter (20 August 1991) arts 
18–23 with 1991 UK Model BIT, arts 2–7. The UK Model BIT was likely taken as inspira-
tion simply because a member of the British delegation was the chairman of the working 
group where the ECT was being negotiated and, hence, it were the British that initi-
ated the compilation of a full first draft of the treaty. See Letter from Martin Rickerd to 
Jonathan Cook (23 August 1991), which accompanied the first draft and read, ‘I enclose a 
copy of the first full draft of the Basic Protocol. I think you will agree that Andrew Young, 
our Legal Adviser, has done an excellent job in pulling together the contributions from 
around Whitehall into a (remarkably concise) homogenous text.’ See also Letter from 
Secretary-General Clive Jones to European Commissioner Cardoso E Cunha (5 September 
1991), which likewise stated, ‘The major work during August has been the preparation 
by the UK of a draft Basic Protocol, in their role as Chairman of Working Group II. In 
the course of this work they have been supported by the NL Presidency and Conference 
Secretariat.’
64   The author has done research at the archives of the Energy Charter Secretariat.
65   Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v The Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, 
Final Award (27 June 1990); Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000); Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, Award (13 November 2000). See also Dolzer and 
Schreuer (n 7) 130.
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At present it seems that providing clarity to ambiguous ECT provisions is 
one of the core elements of the modernisation process.66
3.3 Adversarial Nature of Investment Arbitration
Thirdly, the fact that arbitration – the primary mechanism for ECT investor-
State dispute settlement – is an adversarial rather than inquisitorial process 
may also influence the outcome of a case.67 Arbitrators may decide a case based 
on the arguments and evidence presented to them, meaning that the conduct 
of the counsellors representing the disputing parties can have a significant – 
and direct – impact on the outcome of the case.
Khan v Mongolia illustrates this matter. In this case, the investor invoked 
provisions of the Mongolian Foreign Investment Law through the umbrella 
clause of the ECT, arguing that the obligation to ‘observe any obligations 
entered into’ included the observation of domestic statutory obligations.68 
The tribunal held that, as Mongolia had not put forward a different interpreta-
tion of the provision, it would accept the claimant’s interpretive argument.69 
Had counsel for Mongolia argued, on the basis of previous ECT awards and 
the text of the treaty itself, that domestic statutory provisions had to be 
‘entered into’ by Mongolia with the investor – thus limiting the scope of the 
provision to consensual obligations only – the case might have been decided 
differently.70 The fact that Mongolia’s counsel did not do so would eventually 
trigger Mongolia’s liability for a breach of the umbrella clause.71
Similarly, the Khan case might have been decided differently had the tri-
bunal applied the principle of jura novit curia – on the basis of which ECT 
tribunals are seen to know the law and may apply it on their own initiative.72 
Despite the fact that the International Court of Justice accepts this principle, 
66   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
67   Jan H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and 
Trade Law, vol 1 (Hart Publishing 2016) 422–426, 605–607, 649–650.
68   See, in particular, the last sentence of art 10(1) ECT. See also Khan (n 46) para 438.
69   ibid.
70   Plama (n 23) para 186; Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul (n 46) para 257; Liman Caspian Oil 
(n 46) para 448; Isolux (n 23) paras 767–771.
71   Khan Resources Inc, Khan Resources BV, and Cauc Holding Company Ltd v The Government 
of Mongolia, PCA Case No 2011–09, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits (2 March 2015) 
paras 295–296, 366.
72   Hans van Houtte and Maurizio Brunetti, ‘Investment Arbitration – Ten Areas of Caution 
for Commercial Arbitrators’ (2013) 29 Arb Intl 553, 571; Eric De Brabandere, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law (CUP 2014) 101.
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its application in investment arbitration, especially in non-ICSID procedures, 
remains more contested.73
As investment arbitration intrinsically involves public interests, it has been 
argued that it is desirable for arbitrators to adopt a more inquisitorial attitude 
than would be required from their counterparts in commercial arbitration.74
3.4 Arbitrator Remuneration
Fourthly, the remuneration scheme for the arbitrators’ fees may influence one’s 
incentive to write an elaborately reasoned award which, in turn, may enhance 
the overall quality of the award and, consequently, contribute to the consis-
tency of ECT awards more generally.75 Even though the present author does 
not wish to question the integrity and motives of arbitrators, the importance 
of legal reasoning cannot be overstated since a fully reasoned award is, among 
others, likely to reveal the analytical process adopted by the tribunal which 
may benefit parties’ acceptance of the outcome.76 Although it is admittedly 
difficult to support this argument with evidence, the strongly varying quality 
and persuasiveness of ECT awards is remarkable.77
Article 26 ECT permits four different sets of arbitration rules with diverging 
fee structures: under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules, the arbitrators’ fee is USD 3,000 per day; the UNCITRAL rules dictate 
that ‘[t]he fees and expenses of the arbitrators shall be reasonable in amount, 
taking into account the amount in dispute, the complexity of the subject mat-
ter, the time spent by the arbitrators and any other relevant circumstances of 
73   Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Iceland) 
(Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 3, para 17; Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi 
Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment 
(3 July 2002) para 84; CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award (14 March 2003) para 411; Mr Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ICSID Case No ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the 
Award (1 November 2006) para 57; RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, ICSID Case 
No ARB/05/14, Decision on RSM Production Corporation’s Application for a Preliminary 
Ruling (7 December 2009) para 23; Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v Romania, ICSID 
Case No ARB/12/25, Award of the Tribunal (18 April 2017) paras 210–212. See also De 
Brabandere (n 72) 101–110.
74   Stephan W Schill, ‘Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator’ (2010) 23 
LJIL 401, 422–423; De Brabandere (n 72) 115–116.
75   Schill (n 74) 424–428; Dalhuisen (n 67) 619–627.
76   Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 
(Grotius 1982) 37–45.
77   Schill has developed a comparable argument but focused on the quality of the reasoning 
of arbitral awards rendered under various institutional rules, see Schill (n 74) 424–428.
Downloaded from Brill.com05/22/2019 10:17:32AM
via Universiteit Groningen
442 Verburg
Journal of World Investment & Trade 20 (2019) 425–454
the case’; whereas the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) rules state 
that arbitrator fees are determined by the amount in dispute.78
Some prime examples of ECT awards that do not provide for elaborate legal 
reasoning happen to be SCC awards, suggesting that this approach to the cal-
culation of fees may incentivise arbitrators to provide only brief reasons for 
their decisions when the amount in dispute is relatively low. The tribunals in 
Nykomb v Latvia and Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic were both very concise in their 
analysis and primarily applied the facts of the case to the ECT without provid-
ing clear legal reasoning as to the meaning of said ECT provisions.79 About the 
Petrobart award, Zukova even went so far as to state that ‘the failure of the tri-
bunal to provide adequate reasoning for its determinations calls the credibility 
and authority of the final award into question.’80
This phenomenon can perhaps best be contrasted with the Yukos cases, 
where the tribunal operated under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules and the 
arbitrators were not bound to a flat fee remuneration scheme. In stark contrast 
to the aforementioned SCC cases, the arbitrators in the Yukos cases received 
between EUR 1,5 and 2 million respectively with even the tribunal’s assistant 
taking home almost EUR 1 million.81 The reasoning in the Yukos awards is how-
ever substantially more extensive and elaborate, with the Interim and Final 
Awards amounting to nearly 850 pages combined.
3.5 Lack of Participation ECT Contracting Parties in the Interpretation 
of the Treaty
Finally, the very limited role that ECT Contracting Parties have played in the 
interpretation process of the ECT after the conclusion of the treaty may have 
precluded them from filling in the blanks of those ambiguous ECT provisions. 
78   UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) 15 ILM 701, art 39(1). UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (as revised in 2010) art 41(1); Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (entered into force 1 January 2017) (SCC Arbitration 
Rules) appendix IV, sch costs art 2.
79   For example, in Nykomb, the tribunal’s analysis of expropriation and discrimination was 
limited to one paragraph respectively. Fees in this case were limited to EUR 90,000 for the 
chairman and EUR 49,500 for the party appointed arbitrators. See Nykomb (n 46) paras 
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 7. Likewise, in Petrobart, the legal reasoning with respect to ECT provisions 
is very limited. The chairman in this case received EUR 55,066 and the party appointed 
arbitrators EUR 33,040. See Petrobart (n 14) 88–89.
80   Galina Zukova, ‘The Award in Petrobart Limited v Kyrgyz Republic’ in Guillermo Alvarez 
and Michael Reisman (eds), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment 
Arbitration: Critical Case Studies (Brill 2008) 323, 347.
81   Yukos Universal Limited v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 227, Final Award 
(18 July 2014) paras 1860–1863.
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Of course, those States that have found themselves in the role of respondent 
have contributed to the interpretation of the ECT. Aside those, the partici-
pation of other Contracting Parties is rather limited. To date, the European 
Commission serves as the only example of a Contracting Party intervening as 
amicus curiae in cases wherein it is not the respondent.
Under NAFTA, by comparison, all of the Contracting Parties have actively 
participated in the interpretation of the NAFTA, other than acting as respon-
dent, in two ways. Firstly, in 2001, acting through the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission, parties adopted a binding interpretive note on Article 1105 
NAFTA, which contains the FET standard.82 The Free Trade Commission did 
so on the basis of Article 1131(2) NAFTA.83 These agreements between the 
Contracting Parties on the interpretation of the treaty may also be relevant 
even if the applicable treaty does not contain an explicit provision similar to 
NAFTA, although such agreements may than not be binding upon a tribunal. 
For example, Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) states that ‘[a]ny subsequent agreement between the parties regard-
ing the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ shall be 
taken into account when interpreting the treaty.84 Various NAFTA tribunals 
identified both Article 1131 NAFTA and Article 31(3)(a) VCLT as a legal basis to 
take the interpretive note into account.85 The ECT contains no such mecha-
nism, although a declaration to that effect is possible. The International Law 
Commission has confirmed that, to that end, unanimous agreement by all par-
ties to the treaty ‘constitutes a true interpretative agreement which represents 
the will of the “masters of the treaty” and thus an authentic interpretation.’86 
82   NAFTA Free Trade Commission, ‘North American Free Trade Agreement Notes of 
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions’ (31 July 2001) (NAFTA Notes of Interpre-
tation) <www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding_e.asp> accessed 
28 November 2018.
83   North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) (adopted 
17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994) (1993) 32 ILM 289 (NAFTA) art 1131(2).
84   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art 31(3)(a).
85   Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal 
on Jurisdiction and the Merits (3 August 2005) pt II ch B paras 11–21; The Canadian 
Cattlemen for Fair Trade v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction 
(28 January 2008) paras 181–184; William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas 
Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc v Government of Canada, PCA Case No 
2009-04, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (17 March 2015) para 430.
86   International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of Its 63rd Session’ (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/10/
Add.1, 559.
Downloaded from Brill.com05/22/2019 10:17:32AM
via Universiteit Groningen
444 Verburg
Journal of World Investment & Trade 20 (2019) 425–454
NAFTA practice demonstrates that such action by the treaty parties can have 
a significant influence on tribunal decision-making.87
Secondly, non-disputing State Parties of NAFTA have intervened in ongo-
ing arbitration proceedings by virtue of Article 1128 NAFTA, which allows a 
NAFTA Party to ‘make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpreta-
tion of this Agreement.’ This provision ‘provides an official channel through 
which the parties can agree upon such interpretation, without taking position 
on the facts related to the dispute before the Tribunal.’88 Such submissions 
may constitute either a ‘subsequent agreement’ under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT 
or ‘subsequent practice’ under Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, which shall be taken 
into account by a tribunal when interpreting the treaty.89 A review of NAFTA 
practice shows that non-disputing States tend to submit restrictive interpre-
tations, which, if endorsed by all treaty parties, are often taken into account 
by tribunals – although not so unequivocally as when binding interpretations 
are issued.90
The adoption of such formal mechanisms to facilitate the Contracting 
Parties’ involvement in treaty interpretation would be well worth consider-
ation by the Energy Charter Conference during its modernisation process. 
Unfortunately, it currently is not on the list of approved topics.91
4 Enhancing Legal Certainty in ECT Dispute Settlement
While it is impossible to discuss the remedies against all causes of inconsis-
tencies in ECT dispute settlement in the confines of one article, this section 
explores some of the options available through which to enhance legal cer-
tainty in ECT procedures. The identification of available tools to implement 
87   Andrea J Menaker, ‘Treatment of Non-Disputing State Party Views in Investor-State 
Arbitrations’ in Arthur W Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration 
and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2008, vol 2 (Brill 2009) 59, 67.
88   Gazzini (n 57) 193.
89   Canadian Cattlemen (n 85) paras 186–189; Meg N Kinnear, Andrea K Bjorklund and 
John FG Hannaford, Investment Disputes Under NAFTA: An Annotated Guide to NAFTA 
Chapter 11 (Kluwer Law International, 2006–2009) 1128-4c; Gazzini (n 57) 193.
90   Menaker (n 87) 68–73; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Non-Disputing State Submissions in 
Investment Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic Protection?’ in Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, Marcelo Kohen and Jorge E Viñuales (eds), Diplomatic and Judicial Means of 
Dispute Settlement (Brill 2012) 307, 314; Wolfgang Alschner, ‘The Return of the Home State 
and the Rise of “Embedded” Investor-State Arbitration’ in Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo 
Polanco Lazo (eds), The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration (Brill 2015) 293, 311.
91   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
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any decision on the modernisation of the ECT is also explicitly on the agenda 
for the Subgroup on Modernization in 2019.92
4.1 Amending the ECT
The most obvious manner in which to address shortcomings in the text of the 
ECT would be by amending problematic provisions. This could be a viable 
long-term solution that allows parties to clarify the content of treaty provisions 
and/or facilitate the establishment of a central ECT appellate mechanism.
However, in the short run, this is unlikely to yield effective results. Amending 
the ECT might be difficult since Article 36(1)(a) ECT requires unanimity of 
those parties present – and voting – at the Energy Charter Conference. Also, 
even if amendments are adopted, these will only affect the relations between 
Contracting Parties that have ratified said amendments.93 The ECTs Trade 
Amendment, concluded in 1998 and entered into force in 2010, is an example 
of a successful amendment to the treaty. However, the fact that it took twelve 
years for the amendment to come into force also highlights the slow pace of 
the procedure. Combined with the knowledge that the Trade Amendment is 
limited in its ambition; its main purpose was to update the ECTs trade regime 
with the rules and practices under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreements, a speedy textual modernisation does not bode well.
4.2 Energy Charter Protocol
A second possible solution could be to conclude an Energy Charter Protocol, 
defined in Article 1(13)(a) ECT as:
a treaty, the negotiation of which is authorized and the text of which 
is adopted by the Charter Conference, which is entered into by two or 
more Contracting Parties in order to complement, supplement, extend 
or amplify the provisions of this Treaty with respect to any specific 
sector or category of activity within the scope of this Treaty, or to areas of 
co-operation pursuant to Title III of the Charter.
An unsuccessful instance wherein the ECT parties tried to negotiate an addi-
tional protocol is the Transit Protocol.94 Taking heed of that attempt, an 
92   ibid.
93   ECT, art 42.
94   Lothar Ehring and Yulia Selivanova, ‘Energy Transit’ in Yulia Selivanova (ed), Regulation 
of Energy in International Trade Law: WTO, NAFTA and Energy Charter (Kluwer 2011) 49, 
95–104; Katja Yafimava, ‘Transit: The EU Energy Acquis and the Energy Charter Treaty’ in 
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important question that is at the core of any ECT protocol that is to be adopted 
in the future, which addresses investment protection or dispute settlement, 
relates to the effect of Article 16 ECT. In essence, Article 16 ECT allows inves-
tors to rely on those provisions most favourable to them in cases where ECT 
Contracting Parties have adopted an international agreement dealing with 
investment protection or dispute settlement. Practically, this means that if the 
ECT parties adopt a protocol that, for example, provides for a lower level of 
investment protection or introduces less favourable dispute settlement proce-
dures, investors would be able to circumvent these new rules by reference to 
Article 16. Of course, the ECT Contracting Parties can always remove Article 16 
from the treaty altogether through an amendment.
Another issue concerning a possible Energy Charter Protocol is the fact that 
it would be consent-based and, as such, would only apply to those ECT parties 
that voluntarily submit thereto, meaning it does ‘not derogate from the rights 
and obligations of those Contracting Parties not party to the Protocol.’95 This 
implies that the contemporary provisions of the ECT would remain in force 
vis-à-vis those ECT parties that do not consent to the new protocol, a situation 
of identical practical outcome to that of an ECT amendment that has not been 
ratified by all ECT parties. Consequently, situations may arise in which diverg-
ing rights and obligations exist amongst the ECT constituency.
4.3 Inter se Modification of the Treaty
Given the difficulties associated with amending the ECT or concluding a sub-
sequent protocol, especially in light of Article 16 ECT, a prospective manner 
in which to align the ECT with contemporary policy preferences between 
like-minded States would be by inter se modification on the basis of Article 41 
VCLT.96 According to Fitzmaurice and Merkouris, inter se modification is 
an ‘essential technique, and a necessary safety valve, for the adjustment of 
Kim Talus (ed), Research Handbook on International Energy Law (Edward Elgar 2014) 593, 
611–623.
95   ECT, art 33(5).
96   On the basis of VCLT, art 41 ‘[t]wo or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may con-
clude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves’ if there is no prohibition 
in the treaty, the modification does not affect the rights and obligations of other parties to 
the treaty and it ‘does not relate to a provision, derogation of which is incompatible with 
the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.’ These condi-
tions are cumulative, see Anne Rigaux and Denys Simon, ‘Article 41 Agreements to Modify 
Multilateral Treaties Between Certain of the Parties Only’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre 
Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 
986, 1002.
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treaties to the dynamic needs of international society.’97 Mindful of the con-
troversy surrounding the content of investment treaties, such a modification 
procedure could be used as a ‘safety valve’.98 Since the ECT does not contain a 
prohibition on modification and one could argue that the obligations concern-
ing investment promotion and protection under the ECT are reciprocal rather 
than absolute, certain ECT parties would be able to modify ECT obligations 
between themselves without affecting those rights of ECT parties uninvolved 
in the process.99
Although inter se modification would not be ideal for the same reasons 
enumerated in Section 4.2, it would allow a group of like-minded States to 
adjust the investment chapter to their needs. Upon reaching critical mass 
within the Energy Charter Conference, one could aim for more structural, 
long-term reforms. For example, since the ECT is currently primarily invoked 
in intra-EU relations, the EU and its Member States could modify the ECT 
inter se, thereby leaving the rights of non-EU investors within the EU unaf-
fected by the modification. In particular, the EU and its Member States may 
use this tool to address the concerns the CJEU espoused in the Achmea judg-
ment by removing the reference to arbitration in Article 26 and merely provide 
for intra-EU ECT dispute settlement through the domestic courts of the host 
State, placing any dispute firmly within the EU legal order under the guiding 
supervision of the CJEU.100 Of course, any proposed modification would have 
to meet the three criteria of Article 41(1) VCLT.101 This implies that certain 
aspects of the ECT cannot be modified inter se. For example, if the EU and its 
Member States would like to modify the rules regarding transit, by excluding 
97   Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris, ‘Re-Shaping Treaties While Balancing 
Interests of Stability and Change: Critical Issues in the Amendment/Modification/
Revision of Treaties’ (2018) 20 Austrian Review of International and European Law 41, 44.
98   ibid 44–5.
99   Rigaux and Simon (n 96) 1003–1005.
100   See Verburg and Lavranos (n 37).
101   In Vattenfall, the European Commission argued that provisions of the EU Treaties 
in effect modified certain provisions of the ECT between EU Member States through 
Article 41 VCLT. The tribunal rejected this argument since the provisions relied upon 
were provisions of the EU Treaties, ie different international agreements instead of an 
agreement relating to the modification of the ECT itself. In passing, the tribunal men-
tioned that Article 16 is a prohibition on modification. According to the present author, 
this is however a misconstruction of the text of Article 16 ECT which regulates the rela-
tionship between the ECT and other international agreements that concern investment 
protection and dispute settlement. It does not, however, say anything about the inability 
to modify the text of the ECT itself. See Vattenfall (n 29) paras 220–221.
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the intra-EU applicability thereof, this would affect the rights and obligations 
of neighbouring countries contrary to Article 41(1)(b)(i) VCLT.
4.4 Energy Charter Declaration
A fourth solution, much less time consuming and politically difficult, may be 
to clarify the content of the treaty rules in their current form.
The ECT provides for the adoption of an Energy Charter Declaration, which 
is defined in Article 1(13)(b) ECT as a ‘non-binding instrument, the negotia-
tion of which is authorized and the text of which is approved by the Charter 
Conference, which is entered into by two or more Contracting Parties to com-
plement or supplement the provisions of this Treaty.’ A declaration by the 
Contracting Parties may constitute an authoritative subsequent agreement 
regarding the interpretation of ECT provisions in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) 
VCLT or may be considered as ‘subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty’ under Article 31(3)(b) VCLT and, through the application of the rules 
of treaty interpretation, influence ECT dispute settlement. Thus, although the 
ECT does not contain a procedure to adopt interpretations that are binding 
upon tribunals akin NAFTA, ECT Contracting Parties may resort to this soft 
law instrument.102 Nevertheless, to increase the chances that such declara-
tions will have the desired effect, two matters need to be kept in mind.
First, to enhance the authority of the declaration its adoption should be 
unanimous.103 Unanimity is preferred over consensus since, in the case of 
unanimity, all parties have explicitly agreed to the declaration while, in the 
case of consensus, the agreement is implicit because of the absence of objec-
tions. Second, the declaration should clarify the content of the existing rules 
of the treaty as opposed to attempting to amend it; the latter approach would 
undermine the authority of the declaration.104 Two examples thereof are 
illustrated below.
An attempt of the ECT Contracting Parties to tie the FET standard of the 
ECT to the international minimum standard of treatment under customary 
102   NAFTA, art 1131(2).
103   UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1 (n 86).
104   A similar point was made by the WTO Appellate Body in relation to the authority of 
WTO members to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreements under Article IX:2 
of the WTO Agreement, see WTO, European Communities: Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 DSU by Ecuador, 
Report of the Appellate Body (26 November 2008) WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, para 
383; WTO, European Communities: Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Report of the Appellate 
Body (26 November 2008) WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para 383. See also Isabelle van 
Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body’ (2010) 21 EJIL 605, 612.
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international law, as happened under NAFTA, would probably be consid-
ered an amendment in disguise.105 A reference to the Liman Caspian Oil v 
Kazakhstan case, where the tribunal held that the ECT’s FET standard ‘is to 
provide a protection which goes beyond the minimum standard of treatment 
under international law’, illustrates this clearly.106 In light of that state-
ment, the gist of which was recently repeated in Antin v Spain, any claim by 
the ECT Contracting Parties that the FET standard of the ECT is supposed 
to provide the international minimum standard of treatment – and not the 
broader autonomous standard of treatment – is unpersuasive.107 Since States 
play a double role as, on the one hand, masters of the treaty and, on the other, 
potential or actual respondents in investment arbitration, tribunals may view 
interpretations perceived to be disguised amendments with scepticism.108
An example that may be more successful relates to the content of inter-
pretive annexes commonly attached to modern IIAs dealing with indirect 
expropriation.109 These annexes aim to provide more clarity on where to draw 
the line between legitimate government regulation and indirect expropria-
tion.110 In Philip Morris v Uruguay, based on the Uruguay-Switzerland BIT that 
contains an expropriation provision comparable to Article 13 ECT, the tribu-
nal explicitly referred to such interpretive annexes despite that the applicable 
treaty did not contain such an annex.111 The fact that neither Switzerland 
nor Uruguay were involved in the treaties that the tribunal referred to was 
105   See NAFTA Notes of Interpretation (n 82).
106   Liman Caspian Oil (n 46) para 263.
107   Antin (n 34) para 530.
108   Christoph Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment 
Arbitration’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias, and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty 
Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2010) 129, 147–148; Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment 
Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104 AJIL 179, 179–180, 212–214; 
Michael Waibel, ‘International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation – Problems, 
Particularities and Possible Trends’ in Hofmann and Tams (n 54) 29, 47–48; Jaime (n 57) 
292; Reinisch (n 54) 405–407. See also Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, Award in Respect of Damages (31 May 2002) para 47.
109   CETA, annex 8-A.
110   Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products SA and Abal Hermanos SA v The Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016) para 300; Anne K 
Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment 
Protection (OUP 2008) 151, 166–167. The expropriation provision of CETA, art 8.12, mir-
rors ECT art 13.
111   Philip Morris (n 110). See also Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Switzerland-Uruguay) (adopted 7 October 1988, entered into force 22 April 1991) art 5(1).
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irrelevant as the tribunal was of the opinion that the annexes reflected the 
position under general international law.112 This suggests that a declaration 
reflective of the content of these annexes is more likely to be accepted by tri-
bunals as an elucidation of the concept of indirect expropriation, rather than 
constituting an apparent amendment.
Thus, declarations of the Energy Charter Conference that contain more 
guidance on the content of ECT provisions can enhance legal certainty in ECT 
dispute settlement provided that they are adopted by unanimity and do not 
attempt to amend the treaty.
4.5 Non-Disputing ECT Parties as Amicus Curiae
Another method through which to increase the consistent interpretation 
of the ECT would be to strengthen the role of non-disputing ECT parties in 
ongoing arbitration cases and give them a more prominent role in the treaty 
interpretation process. The involvement of third parties can have a material 
effect on the outcome of proceedings.113 In the context of investment arbi-
tration, the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules allow for submissions by a 
non-disputing party to the treaty.114 As stated above, non-disputing parties in 
NAFTA cases have a right to submit their views on the interpretation of the 
treaty.115 Similar provisions can be found in the Dominican Republic – Central 
America – United States Free Trade Agreement, the CPTPP, and the Canadian 
112   Philip Morris (n 110) para 301.
113   See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization) 
(adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 401, arts 10, 17; Statute 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2012] OJ C83/210, art 23; Consolidated 
Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 [2012] OJ 
L265, art 96. See also Marc L Busch and Eric Reinhardt, ‘Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties 
and WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2006) 58(3) World Politics 446, 447; Clifford Carrubba, 
Matthew Gabel and Charles Hankla, ‘Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: 
Evidence from the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 102 Am Pol Sci Rev 435, 449–450; 
Eugenia Levine, ‘Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications 
of an Increase in Third-Party Participation (2011) 29 Berkeley J Intl L 200, 217; Katia Fach 
Gómez, ‘Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: 
How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest’ (2012) 35 Fordham Intl L J 510, 545.
114   UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (effec-
tive from 1 April 2014) (UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency) art 5; Claudia Reith, ‘The 
New UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 2014: Significant Breakthrough or a Regime 
Full of Empty Formula?’ in Marianne Roth and Michael Geistlinger (eds), Yearbook on 
International Arbitration, vol 4 (Intersentia 2015) 121, 136–137.
115   Kinnear, Bjorklund and Hannaford (n 89) 1128–1.
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and US Model BIT’s.116 Likewise, the EU’s trade and investment agree-
ments with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam contain comparable provisions.117 
The common denominator is that each limits the right of non-disputing 
parties to make submissions on issues regarding the interpretation of the 
agreement only.
4.5.1 Applicable Arbitration Rules
The absence of a specific ECT provision entitling non-disputing Contracting 
Parties to make submissions regarding the interpretation of the treaty can be 
considered a shortcoming. Nevertheless, the applicable arbitration rules may 
offer a solution and fill the gap left by the ECT.
Moreover, examples in ECT practice evidence that where non-disputing 
parties have made submissions to a tribunal, tribunals possess the discretion 
whether or not to admit such submissions and, in doing so, may impose condi-
tions on their scope and levy costs on non-disputing parties.
For example, in AES v Hungary and Electrabel v Hungary, the European 
Commission participated in the proceedings as amicus curiae.118 These tribu-
nals, both operating under the ICSID arbitration rules, allowed the Commission 
to intervene on the basis of Rule 37(2) of the ICSID arbitration rules.119 In the 
Electrabel case, the tribunal laid down parameters for the scope of the sub-
mission, although the permitted scope of the Commission’s submissions went 
beyond mere issues regarding the interpretation of the ECT.120 In RREEF v 
Spain, however, the ICSID tribunal twice rejected the Commissions’ attempts 
to intervene.121 In Eiser v Spain, the ICSID tribunal allowed the Commission to 
make a submission contingent on its willingness to pay ‘the additional costs 
of legal presentation reasonably incurred by the parties in responding to’ the 
116   2012 US Model BIT, art 28; 2004 Canada Model BIT, art 35; CPTTP, art 9.23; Dominican 
Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement (adopted 5 August 
2004, entered into force 1 January 2009) art 10.20.
117   CETA, art 8.38; EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (European Union- 
Singapore) (adoption and entrance into force pending) art 3.17; EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) (adoption and entrance into force pending) 
ch 8, art 25.
118   Electrabel, ICSID Case No ARB/07/19, Procedural Order No 4 (28 April 2009); AES (n 27) 
paras 3.18–3.22; Electrabel SA v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/19, Award 
(25 November 2015) para 234.
119   Schreuer and others (n 18) 704.
120   Electrabel, Procedural Order No 4 (n 118) paras 24–26.
121   RREEF (n 26) paras 16–32.
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submission.122 In the latter instance, the submission was withdrawn because 
the Commission was unwilling to entertain such costs.123
In the Charanne v Spain case, where the tribunal operated under the 2010 
SCC rules, the European Commission was granted the opportunity to make 
amicus curiae submissions although it was neither given access to the case 
files nor allowed to attend the hearings.124 The 2017 SCC arbitration rules con-
tain a right, subject to certain conditions, for non-disputing treaty parties to 
make submissions ‘on issues of treaty interpretation’ in a separate appendix for 
investment treaty disputes.125 This is an innovation when compared to the 2010 
SCC arbitration rules. Notwithstanding, no ECT case has yet been decided 
under the new rules in which the issue of an amicus curiae submission arose.
Likewise, the 2013 UNCITRAL arbitration rules provide for submissions 
by non-disputing parties to the treaty ‘on issues of treaty interpretation.’126 
Whenever older versions of the UNCITRAL rules apply, the general proce-
dural powers of UNCITRAL tribunals permit tribunals to accept submissions 
from non-disputing parties.127 Allowing third-party submissions falls in line 
with the practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which operates 
under 1976 UNCITRAL arbitration rules and where ‘outside involvement has 
been deemed acceptable.’128 Thus, even in investment arbitration based on the 
1976 or 2010 UNCITRAL arbitration rules, there is room for non-disputing ECT 
Contracting Parties to make submissions to the tribunal regarding the proper 
interpretation of the treaty.
Nevertheless, an explicit endorsement by the Energy Charter Conference 
of this possibility is desirable. The NAFTA Contracting Parties for example, 
acting through the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, explicitly acknowledged 
by means of a statement that non-disputing parties, including parties other 
than the non-disputing NAFTA parties, may act as amicus curiae.129 This 
statement also sets certain criteria that have to be met by amicus curiae 
122   Eiser (n 36) para 65.
123   ibid paras 66–70.
124   Charanne (n 36) paras 16, 49–60.
125   See SCC Arbitration Rules, art 4, appendix III.
126   2013 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 1(4); UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, art 5.
127   UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), art 15(1); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013), 
art 17(1). See also David D Caron and Lee M Caplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A 
Commentary (OUP 2013) 30–31, 39–41; Clyde Croft, Christopher Kee and Jeff Waincymer, 
A Guide to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (CUP 2013) 176, 192–193.
128   Caron and Caplan (n 127) 40. See also United States v Iran, Case No A17, Decision No Dec 
37-A17-FT (18 June 1985) 8 Iran-US Cl Trib Rep 189, 191.
129   Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation <www 
.sice.oas.org/TPD/NAFTA/Commission/Nondispute_e.pdf> accessed 6 March 2017.
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submissions. Subsequent NAFTA tribunals have explicitly referred to the 
Free Trade Commission’s statement in determining whether to accept amicus 
submissions.130
Thus, investment tribunals who derive their jurisdiction from the ECT can 
allow non-disputing ECT parties to make submissions in ongoing cases – a 
possibility explicitly acknowledged in the 2017 SCC and 2013 UNCITRAL arbi-
tration rules. The ICSID arbitration rules, so too, afford a certain amount of 
discretion to the tribunal. Under the 1976 and 2010 UNCITRAL rules, the gen-
eral procedural powers of the tribunal will have to be exercised. A declaration 
by the Energy Charter Conference that reflects the content of Appendix III of 
the 2017 SCC arbitration rules would strengthen the position of non-disputing 
ECT Parties in this regard. Developments outside the context of the ECT could 
also strengthen the role of non-disputing third treaty parties. For example, 
if more ECT Contracting Parties would sign and ratify the 2014 Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency this could make the UNCITRAL Transparency 
Rules applicable in ECT disputes.
4.5.2 Transparency
It almost goes without saying that encouraging non-disputing ECT parties 
to participate in ECT arbitration requires enhanced transparency by way of 
disclosure of, primarily, the existence of disputes and, secondarily, relevant 
documents such as the notice of arbitration, the parties’ submissions, and deci-
sions rendered by tribunals. A State needs to be aware of a dispute in order to 
be able to participate. Currently, neither investors nor ECT States are obliged 
to inform the Energy Charter Secretariat of existing investor-State disputes. 
In order to make meaningful third-party submissions, non-disputing parties 
should be able to access the notification of intent to arbitrate, the notice of 
arbitration or, preferably, the memoranda of the disputing parties.131 In that 
context, the Energy Charter Secretariat could oversee the distribution of doc-
uments and other relevant information, comparable to the role of the WTO 
130   Glamis Gold, Ltd v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision on Application and 
Submission by Quechan Indian Nation (16 September 2005) paras 9–13; Apotex Inc v The 
Government of the United States of America, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No 2 on the 
Participation of a Non-Disputing Party (11 October 2011) paras 15–35; Eli Lilly and Company 
v The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order 
No 4 (23 February 2016) paras A–B.
131   In Glamis Gold, the non-disputing parties stated ‘that it would be difficult to submit mean-
ingful submissions without first examining the Parties’ memorial and counter-memorial.’ 
See Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No 6 
(15 October 2005) para 11.
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Secretariat. Alternatively, if more ECT Contracting Parties ratify the Mauritius 
Convention, ‘the Secretary-General of the United Nations or an institution 
named by UNCITRAL’ shall act as repository.132 Either way, transparency is 
currently included on the approved list of topics for the ECTs modernisation.133
5 Conclusion
As happened in investor-State disputes under other IIAs as well, the case law 
of ECT disputes suffers from considerable inconsistencies. Considering the 
interests at stake in these procedures, a lack of legal certainty adversely affects 
all parties involved and undermines the ECT’s goal of creating a legal frame-
work that facilitates trade and investment in the energy sector.
While there are various potential causes of these inconsistencies, it is diffi-
cult to pinpoint one specific source noting the plurality of variables at the core 
of legal decisions. Moreover, the fact that investment cases are immensely fact-
specific means that one has to exercise due caution when comparing different 
cases with one another. Nevertheless, given the fact that the ECT’s investment 
chapter prescribes the ‘rule of law’ in investor-State relationships, or so is often 
held, the very concept of the rule of law should be one the strongest arguments 
in favour of more consistency and predictability in ECT dispute settlement. If 
the purpose of the ECT is to establish a legal framework which promotes long-
term cooperation in the energy sector, the treaty should at the very least be 
predictable for those subjected to it.
The ECT can be modernised through a variety of avenues. The Energy 
Charter Conference, acting in unanimity, can employ soft law tools to provide 
more clarity on the content of ECT provisions. This exercise might yield short-
term results. A group of like-minded States can agree on inter se modifications 
of the treaty, which, in turn, can provide the impetus for treaty reform. As a 
long-term solution, more far-reaching tools, such as amending relevant treaty 
provisions, may be necessary. Regardless of the approach that the parties use, 
the recently initiated modernisation process gives the ECT parties an excellent 
opportunity to explore these ideas and bring the treaty in line with 21st century 
policy views.
132   UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, art 8.
133   Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Approved Topics’ (n 10).
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